The effects of taxation on labor supply : evaluating the Gary negative income tax experiment by Burtless, Gary T. & Hausman, Jerry A.


working paper
department
of economics
The Effect of Taxation on Labor Supply:
Evaluating the Gary Negative Income Tax Experiment
by
Gary Burt less and Jerry Hausman
Number 211 November 197 7
massachusetts
institute of
technology
50 memorial drive
Cambridge, mass. 02139

MASS. INST. TECH.
DEWEY LIBRARY
The Effect of Taxation on Labor Supply:
Evaluating the Gary Negative Income Tax Experiment
by
f'.ary Burtless and Jerry Hausman
Number 211 November 1977
The views expressed in this paper are the authors 1 sole
responsibility and do not reflect those of the Department of
Economics, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, HEW or
the National Science Eoundation.
IHJ3T VMl 28AM
b\yi c ham
I GW30
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries
http://www.archive.org/details/effectsoftaxatioOOburt
The economic theory of consumer choice derives consumer demands
under the assumption of a constant price which is independent of quantity
demanded by the consumer. Empirical estimation of consumer demand func-
tions then depends on a functional relationship between the price of a
commodity and the amount of the quantity which is consumed. Many actual
situations do not conform to these classical assumptions. Totally within
the private sector, nonlinear prices may arise in industries with sub-
stantial fixed costs. Here average price and marginal price are not equal
so the choice of the "correct" price to put in the demand function is
not straightforward. Electricity prices are the most important example
of this situation. The existence of government income tax and income
transfer programs, however, are the primary source of nonlinear consumer
prices. Net, after tax, wage rates almost always depend on the number
of hours of work supplied. For instance, workers facing a progressive
income tax have net wage rates that decline as gross earnings rise.
Other important examples are AFDC programs and social security payments
for individuals between 65-72 years of age. Here income transfers are
accompanied by high marginal tax rates. These programs not only cause
prices to be nonlinear, but also cause budget sets to be nonconvex,
which further complicates the theory and estimation of labor supply.
Most econometric studies of labor supply assume that the most preferred
level of work effort for an individual depends on a single wage rate that
is independent of the chosen level of hours of work. Thus the endogeneity
of the net wage rate is ignored. When it has been considered, only reduced
form estimates have been computed. These estimates have the disadvantage
that they depend on the particular sample information used and cannot be
used to evaluate the expected effect of policy changes. In this paper we
propose an alternative method of estimating labor supply functions in the
presence of nonlinear net wages. The technique follows from a structural
model of individual labor supply choice when the net wage depends on hours
of work supplied. Thus individual choice depends on all net wages which
comprise the budget set so that policy changes can be evaluated using the
parameter estimates. The model we estimate has one other important dif-
ference from usual models of labor supply. We allow for a distribution of
preferences in the population for the labor-leisure choice. This broad-
ening of the traditional model seems called for by the observed data in
which otherwise identical individuals have widely differing labor supply
choices. Our findings confirm this observation since a very skewed dis-
tribution of preferences is observed.
The model developed here is used to evaluate the effects of a Negative
Income Tax (NIT) experiment in Gary, Indiana. In this experiment, income
transfer payments were made to families on the basis of an income support
level which depended on family size and a tax rate of either 40% or 60%.
Beyond a given number of hours worked, an individual's earnings were taxed
at the usual federal and state tax rates. A complicated budget constraint
resulted which consisted of linear segments connected by kink points. We
estimate the unknown parameters of the uncompensated labor supply function
together with the associated indirect utility function to evaluate the
income and substitution effects of the NIT. An important question con-
sidered is how large are the appropriate income and wage elasticities.
We further consider the likely pattern of response to an NIT in the popula-
tion. The estimates found here can be compared to labor supply response
estimates from other NIT experiments in New Jersey and in Seattle and
Denver. Our findings imply that a NIT has only a very small effect on a
substantial proportion of the population; but that a significant number of
individuals' labor supply decisions may be affected quite substantially.
The first section of the paper discusses the problem of nonlinear
net wages. It shows how a progressive income tax leads to a convex budget
set while government transfer programs like a NIT lead to nonconvex budget
sets in which certain choices of hours worked can never be optimum.
Thus, the importance of knowing the form of both the labor supply function
and the associated indifference curve map is emphasized. In Section 2 we
use the modern theory of duality to derive the indifference curve map
through the indirect utility function. This utility function is derived
from an ordinary specification of labor supply. Restrictions from the
theory of consumer demand are derived so that the parameter estimates will
not lead to violation of the theory of individual choice. Next we consider
utility maximization and consumer choice in the presence of nonlinear net
wages. We calculate the preferred point along a budget line at which
individual choice jointly determines both hours worked and net marginal
wage. To complete the specification of the model, we propose a stochastic
specification which allows for both individual variation in preferences and
the more traditional deviation between preferred hours of work and actual
observed hours of work. Section 4 discusses the operation of the Gary NIT
experiment and the actual calculation of individual budget sets. Since
some individuals acted as controls, we also consider budget sets of in-
dividuals facing only a progressive income tax. Potential data problems
are also discussed. In Section 5 we present the results of maximum like-
lihood estimation of our structural model. While an important income e-
lasticity response is found, no associated uncompensated wage elasticity
response seems to be present. Lastly, we discuss the policy implications
of the results and indicate possible future research.
1. Labor Supply With Nonlinear Net Wages
The economic theory of labor supply is a straightforward application
of utility maximization. Individuals face a given market determined
wage along with prices of other consumption goods. Workers are assumed to
choose the desired amount of hours of work which corresponds to the
most preferred point on their budget sets. * In the familiar two-good
diagram of hours supplied and expenditure on other goods, the slope of the
budget set is the normalized wage w = w/p and the intercept y = y/p is
normalized nonlabor income where w and y are the market wage and nonlabor
income, respectively, and we use the price of the consumption good as the
numeraire. In Figure 1.1, -H* is the point which corresponds to the most
preferred point created by the tangency of the indifference curve to the
budget set:
1.
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However, an important shortcoming of this analysis is the failure to
incorporate the fact that the individual faces a nonconsistent net wage,
w(l-t) , where t is the marginal tax rate. If t were a constant independent
of labor supplied and y were also independent of -H, then the budget line
would simply be rotated counterclockwise. The previous analysis would be
correct using the correctly measured net wage.
'The theory of labor supply is sometimes stated as a theory of leisure
demand given full income, see Becker [1965]. However, we will treat
hours supplied as the variable of interest using a minus sign for hours
worked in the utility function to maintain the usual monotonicity con-
ventions. Also, in the econometric estimation, we will Account for the
fact that individuals may not be able to work their desired amount.
However, proportional tax systems are used only at the state and
local tax level so that the analysis must account for nonlinear budget
sets created by progressivity in tax formulae. Thus, the budget set
is piecewise linear, with kinks at points where income rises sufficiently
to put the individual into the next higher tax bracket. The effect of
a progressive tax system is to create a quasiconvex budget set like the
one shown in Figure 1.2: «
r-v« 1.1-
In this highly simplified version of a progressive tax system,
-H- and -H„ correspond to the kink points induced by the tax system
and -H* is the preferred amount of labor supply. This convex nonlinear! ty
creates problems for the theory and estimation of labor supply. Theoreti-
cally, the usual comparative statics results must take account of the kink
points and how their location depends on the gross wage. For estimation
the problems are especially severe. Typical labor supply specifications
have the form
(1.1) H = g(w,y,z,e)
,
where z is a vector of individual characteristics, and e is a stochastic
term. Within the context of this type of labor supply function it is
not obvious which net wage should be included as the variable explaining
labor supply. Nor is it straightforward to decide which level of nonlabor
income to specify. For instance if the net wage that corresponds to the
second segment of the budget set of Figure 1.2, w , were chosen we might
want to use "virtual income", y , that corresponds to the intercept which
equals nonlabor income of the budget set that the individual faces at the
margin.
Hall [1973] noted that a worker can be considered to be facing a
linear budget constraint that is tangent to his actual budget set at the
observed level of hours of work. For example, the individual facing the
budget set drawn in Figure 1.2 and observed to be working H* hours can
be considered to be facing a single wage rate, w
, and a single level
of virtual income, y„. While this procedure is an important advance over
using the gross wage, it cannot yield unbiased single-equation estimates
because of the presence of the stochastic term e in equation (1.1).
Since both the net wage and virtual income are functions of hours worked H,
they will be correlated with e inducing a simultaneous equation or errors
in variables problem into the estimation procedure. In a study of tax
response among married women Rosen [1976] attempted to avoid the simul-
taneity problem by using the slope and intercept of the budget line at 1500
hours of work per year. Considered as an instrumental variables procedure,
it is not clear how highly correlated Rosen's measure is with the actual
net wage. Hausman-Wise [1976] using time series-cross section data used a
more specific instrumental variable, basing their instrument on a predic-
tion of past hours of work. However, this approach is not fully satis-
* Certainly the gross wage should not be used if substantial divergence
exists between the gross wage and the net wage since an upward biased
errors in variables problem will result. Hurd [1976] has included all
wages in equation (1.1) but this specification can be considered, at best,
a reduced form estimate where the estimated values of the parameters
depend on the specific budget sets faced by individuals in the sample.
factory since the stochastic term e is found to be correlated over time.
Another approach is to estimate the probability that an individual's
preferred point is on a particular linear segment, and then to estimate
hours worked as a random variable that is censored at the kink points and
that is a function of the net wage and virtual income for that segment.
Again, this approach is only a reduced form approach since the probability
model parameter estimates depend on the particular budget sets faced by
individuals in the sample and would change with different budget sets.
This problem of a nonlinear budget set would be solved if we had
sufficient knowledge about the form of the utility function. Suppose we
choose a particular form of the utility function and then adopt an addi-
tive stochastic specification of the labor supply function. The labor
supply function can be written
(1.2) H = h(w
1
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where h(») is the consumer's supply function for labor, derived from
maximizing the individual utility function. * Discrepancies from utility
maximization would be represented by e; but since all the right hand
side variables can be treated as exogenous, the unknown parameters of
the utility function could be estimated. No problems of "which" net
wage or "which" level of nonlabor income to use would arise since they are
fully taken into account in the utility maximization.
"Note that for nearly all utility functions h(*) will be a complicated
function of net wages and nonlabor income. In fact, it will probably
not exist in closed form for nonlinear budget constraints. However, it
can be calculated easily by numerical techniques on a computer. The
actual procedure used will be discussed in Section 3. Heckman [197A]
proposed an alternative procedure in which net wages are estimated as
a function of hours worked. If the form of the budget set is known,
this relationship would be exact so that a random variable, hours worked,
u)id an exact nonlinear transformation of It appear on both sides of the
equation.
8When government programs beyond the progressive income tax are considered,
the situation becomes even more complex since the resulting budget set
may be nonconvex. Consider the operation of the NIT program that we study
empirically in this paper. An income transfer, T, is calculated on the
basis of a family's income guarantee, the NIT marginal tax rate, and
family income. At the breakeven point, H, in Figure 1.3, the income
transfer is completely taxed away due to high family earnings, and the
earner returns to the federal and state income tax schedules. At this
point the net wage rate rises, creating a nonlinearity in the budget
set. Not only are four wage rates encountered, but an additional problem
F»\ \i
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arises. Since the breakeven point represents a nonconvex kink point,
there exists an interval along the budget line in the vicinity of break-
even that may never contain a global maximum if, as is generally assumed,
indifference curves are convex. Furthermore, the exact size and location
of this interval depends on the specification and unknown parameters of
the underlying utility function. Observed hours of work may sometimes
fall in this interval if there are errors in optimization or institutional
rigidities, but the implied restrictions on globally optimal hours must
be taken into account in the estimation of labor supply.
The case of a nonconvex budget set emphasizes the importance of
knowledge about the underlying utility function. This type of nonconvexity
is encountered not only in the negative income tax, but also in other
earnings related taxes or subsidies — for example, child care payments,
social security payments for individuals from 62-72 years old, AFDC, and
food stamp subsidies. Knowledge about the form of the utility function
would permit estimation within the context of equation (1.2) although
determination of the utility maximizing point would be more complicated
than in the previous case due to the nonconvexity of the budget set.
In this section we have specified the complications in the theory
of labor supply which arise when individuals face nonlinear budget sets
due to government tax and subsidy programs where the marginal tax rate
is determined by earnings. The main problem for econometric purpose
is the multiplicity of net wage rates which the individual faces in de-
ciding on his labor supply. We have emphasized how knowledge of the utility
function, up to its unknown parameters, would help to solve the problem.
Yet all our empirical knowledge arises from observing the uncompensated
labor supply function of equation (1.1), since utility is never observed.
In the next section we show how knowledge of the uncompensated labor
supply function can be used to derive knowledge of the utility function
for purposes of econometric estimation.
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2. Derivation of the Indirect Utility Function
Nonconvexity of the budget set requires specification of a parametric
form for the indifference curves to determine the set of points which
cannot correspond to utility maximizing behavior. In the case of both
convex and nonconvex budget sets , a complete model of consumer behavior
requires knowledge of the indifference curve to determine the appropriate
prices that the consumer faces. Two possible approaches to the problem are
apparent. The direct approach is to specify a form of the direct or in-
direct utility function and then to derive the consumer demand equations.
For example, a Cobb-Douglas utility function could be specified leading to
a leisure demand (labor supply) equation which can be estimated. This
approach, taken by Burtless [1976], places strong restrictions on the labor
supply elasticities. ' Less restrictive utility specifications such as
the second order flexible form utility functions outlined by Diewart [1974]
might also be used. However, the flexible form specifications lead to
complicated labor supply equations which would be extremely difficult to
estimate given a nonlinear budget set.
A second approach, which we will use here, arises from the theory of
duality. In the context of consumer demand theory, Roy [1947] did pio-
neering research including the derivation of the identity relating con-
2.
sumer demand to the indirect utility function. Define the consumers
utility maximization problem as maximizing a utility function u(x) where
"Since the first draft of this paper was completed, we have found Wales
and Woodland [1977] using a CES utility function. However, they do not
permit variation in preferences in the population as Burtless does.
2
'Hotelling, Wold, Samuelson, and Houthakker all made important contribu-
tions to the use of duality in consumer demand theory. Other contributions
and a review of the theory are found in Diewert [1974].
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x = (x-,...,30 an N-dimensional utility function, subject to the budget
constraint p«x < y where p = (p..,...,p ) is the vector of prices and y
is the individual's income. Then the indirect utility function relates the
maximum utility the consumer can attain, as a function of the exogenous
variables p and y. ' The function is determined by the solution to the
utility maximization problem
(2.1) v(p,y) = max [u(x) : p*x < yj
x
Because utility is an unobserved variable, estimation can take place only
by observing consumer demand. Here Roy's Identity simplifies matters
since it relates consumer demand to the indirect utility function by
the formula
(2 .2) x . = . MZill , MJULL i = i,...,N .
1 dp^ dy
We propose to use Roy's Identity "in reverse". That is, considerable
empirical knowledge has been built up about labor supply together with
the functional forms useful in estimating it. In fact, all our knowledge
about the specific form of utility functions, both direct and indirect,
must arise from observations of consumer demand. Thus, our approach
is to integrate Roy's Identity to derive the form of the indirect utility
function rather to specify the utility function a_ priori . The resulting
indirect utility function will be consistent with consumer theory since it
is derived using only the assumptions of utility maximization, and consistent
with the data to the extent that the specified labor supply function is
2
supported by observed behavior.
'For the present seccion we are assuming linear prices and a straight
line budget set.
2.
Rosen [1974] emphasizes the importance of using the observed consumer
behavior to achieve a proper specification of the utility function.
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Integration of equation (2.2) over all N goods raises the integrability
problem that the function obtained must satisfy restrictions on the Slutsky
matrix: rank N-l, symmetry, and negative semi-definiteness. This integration
would be difficult and also fruitless since we do not have observations
over consumer demand for all goods. Instead, we simplify to a two good
case where the goods are labor supply and expenditure on all other goods.
This two good approach has been (implicitly) taken in almost all studies
of labor supply. In order to aggregate N-l goods, justifications may be
offered. A possible justification arises from assuming homogeneous weak
separability of preferences between labor supply and the other N-l goods.
This approach, due to Leontief, seems a reasonable assumption since labor
supply differs so much from other consumption goods. It also permits the
two good approach to be applied to cross section data where individuals do
not face approximately the same prices.
Given a two good model, the integrability problem dissolves. One
diagonal element of the two by two Slutsky matrix determines the other 3
elements, since all expenditure not made on labor supply (leisure demand)
must go to the remaining good. Thus, the only requirements imposed by the
theory of consumer demand are that the compensated labor supply derivative
with respect to the wage be greater than or equal to zero and that the
indirect utility function be monotone nondecreasing in the wage and in
nonlabor income. ' Once we have estimated the unknown parameters in
the indirect utility function we have obtained all the observable informa-
tion possible about the consumer's indifference map. This information
will, however, be sufficient to estimate the labor supply effects of
other government tax and subsidy programs.
"The compensated derivative is positive, not negative, since work is
supplied while leisure is demanded. These requirements correspond to
the quasi convexity and monotonicity properties of indirect utility func-
tions. For further details see Diewert [1974, pp. 120-133].
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To obtain the indirect utility function, we need to specify a model
of labor supply. We use the constant elasticity specification because
it has been successfully used in other labor supply investigations (Hausman
and Wise [1976], Lillard [1977]) and leads to a convenient indirect utility
function. The labor supply function is
(2.3) h = kway
P
where h is hours worked over the appropriate period, k is a constant de-
termined by individual characteristics, w is the net wage, and y is non-
labor income. ' Using Roy's identity of equation (2.3) with the insertion
of a negative sign since labor supply is a "bad"
(2. A) -kwV = ^ pSsixL / pSsuil .dw 3y
To derive the indirect utility function we use the implicit function
theorem
(2.5) kwadw = -y~ gdy .
Then integrating both sides using the separability of the differential
2,
equation where c is the constant of integration
1+a 1-6
(2.6) k |__ = _Z__ +c .
'Wage and income are both divided by the consumer goods price deflator
so we take the composite price of other goods as numeraire.
2.
Separability of the labor supply function in the wage and nonlabor
income is the crucial simplification which permits this approach. A
more general specification is h = kr(w)s(y). Note that the integration
is only done locally over the range of the observed data so that boundary
conditions can be ignored.
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We choose the constant of integration c as our cardinal measure of utility
and rearranging terms leads to the indirect utility function '
1+a 1-8
(2.7) c-vCw.y) ^k^ + f^
Equation (2.8) is thus the indirect utility function that corresponds
to the constant elasticity labor supply function. The monotonicity prop-
2
erties are satisfied if utility is nondecreasing in w and y. To derive
the Slutsky matrix restriction on the indirect utility function, we
use the Slutsky equation
(2.8) |^= s + h|^dw ww dy
where s is the compensated wage derivative. Upon taking derivatives
and simplifying
(2.9) • s =i (« -il) .
ww h w y
Then the Slutsky restriction s > implies a > Bhw/y. Taking the ex-
ww
pected case of 6 < 0,
. 1+a
(2.10) ^__y|. ,,
This quasi-convexity condition is automatically satisfied if a > as
we would expect for a sample of low income males since k > 0. If a < 0,
then we would need to check the observations in the sample to make certain
that inequality (2.12) holds.
'In principle the direct utility function may be derived from the indirect
utility function by a constrained minimization problem. For the constant
elasticity specification a closed form does not exist. However, nowhere
is the direct utility function needed since labor supply and the effects
of alternative tax and subsidy programs can be calculated solely from the
indirect utility function and the expenditure function.
2
"'These properties are satisfied globally with the limiting case of
a = -1.0 and 8 = +1.0 corresponding to the Cobb-Douglas specification.
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In this section we have derived the indirect utility function corre-
sponding to an ordinary model of labor supply using Roy's Identity. The
sign restrictions to insure monotonicity and quasi-convexity of the in-
direct utility function have also been derived. However, these derivations
were based on the classical assumptions of linear prices and a straight
line budget constraint. Yet almost all government income tax and income
transfer programs create nonlinear prices, leading to convex or nonconvex
budget sets. In the next section we demonstrate how to calculate labor
supply is determined in the more complicated case using the derived in-
direct utility function.
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3. Nonlinear Budget Sets and Stochastic Specification
A consumer is assumed to select his most preferred level of hours,
H*, on the basis of a set of preference parameters 9 = (k,a,8). Given
values of these parameters, a worker facing a convex budget set of the type
pictured in Figure 1.2 or a nonconvex budget set of the type in Figure 1.3
will choose a certain level of labor supply, and this choice may be cal-
culated by using the indirect utility function. Note that direct use of
the uncompensated labor supply function is impossible due to the multi-
plicity of net wages faced by the consumer. In the case of a nonconvex
budget set we must also ascertain the range of the interval around the
breakeven point that can never contain a utility maximizing choice.
Once the utility maximization problem is solved for a single individual, we
proceed to a statistical specification that permits differences among
individuals to be reflected in differences in the parameters of their
indirect utility functions. Given the significant variation observed in
hours worked for observationally equivalent individuals, it seems inappro-
priate to simply add an additive stochastic disturbance to the estimated
labor supply function. Allowing for
A
a distribution of preferences for work
in the population is therefore an important component of our model of
labor supply.
•ii
Fvs. *.\
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To demonstrate how preferred hours of work H* are derived given
an indirect utility function with parameters 6 when an individual is
faced with a nonlinear budget set, consider Figure 3.1. The first budget
segment is described by the slope, representing the net wage w
1
,
and
the intercept y , which represents nonlabor income at zero hours work.
Similarly, the second budget segment is described by net wage w and by
virtual nonwage income y„. For a given set of preference parameters the
maximum indirect utility on segment one may be calculated as v.. (w
1 ,y )
along with associated hours of work h- (w. ,y-) . This indirect utility may
then be compared to the corresponding maximum indirect utility on segment
two, v (w„,y
2 )
which has preferred hours of work h
?
(w„,y_). The maximum
maximorum, v*(w. »w_,y. ,y_) , equals the greater of v or v„, which in turn
determine the global maximum of hours of work H*(w ,w
9 ,y. ,y_) . The case of
the convex budget set of Figure 1.2 is treated in the same manner, and the
extension to an indefinite number of budget segments is immediate. ' All
that is required is the comparison of maximized utility on each budget
segment, a comparison that is easily made using the indirect utility func-
tion.
Since the goal of empirical work is to estimate the unknown parameters
of the uncompensated labor supply function, we now specify a stochastic
theory of labor supply variation in a cross-section of individuals. In-
dexing individuals by i, we expect random differences to occur between ob-
served hours supplied, H
, and preferred hours of work, H*. This random
variation is caused by institutional factors and by measurement error.
"The convex budget set case does differ to the extent that an optimum
at the kink point does not in general correspond to a unique indifference
curve. This problem is solved in equations (3.4) and (3.5).
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A worker may not be observed to be working at exactly H* because of the
inflexibility of hours of work in most jobs or because hours are not ac-
curately measured on the survey questionnaire. These sources of random
variation are not affected by the location of the budget sets or by
the values of the preference parameters, 8.
Another form of randomness in the data occurs because of individual
variation in tastes. Two individuals with the same personal character-
istics who face the same budget sets may prefer to work substantially
different amounts. From a policy standpoint these individual differences
are very important in determining the response to alterations in the
budget set induced by government programs. In estimating the unknown
parameters k, a, and (3, all may be specified to be functions of measurable
and unmeasurable individual differences. However, this very general spec-
ification leads to an intractable estimation problem. In our empirical
work a number of specifications were attempted using an instrumental vari-
able estimator for the uncompensated labor supply function. This ex-
perimentation suggested that k may best be treated as a function of meas-
urable individual differences, while a. and $. are apparently independent
of differences in measured personal characteristics. The actual specifica-
tion used in this paper is presented, however, with the caveat that sig-
nificant additional research is needed.
The constant term in the labor supply function of equation (2.4) is there-
fore specified to be a function of both measured and nonmeasured individual
differences. Since we also assume that there will be random variation
in uncompensated labor supply due to errors in measuring preferred hours,
it will be convenient to subsume this random disturbance in our specifica-
tion of the constant term. Thus,
19
(3.1) k
±
= exp(Z
±
& +^21^ »
where z Is a vector of individual characteristics and e Is assumed
2 1
to be distributed N(0,ct
2
). The two other individual parameters a.
and g may both be expected to vary in the population. Technically
both distributions are identified so that given ideal data the parameters
of both distributions can be estimated. As a practical matter, estimation
currently seems limited to allowing one of the two parameters to vary.
Thus, we decided to permit either a. or g , but not both, to vary in
the population. Empirical results led us to specify a. = a a constant
and to specify g as a random variable in the population.
The integrability conditions discussed in Section 2 impose restric-
tions arising on the distribution of the g. . The wage elasticity a
is expected to be nonnegative in a sample of low income workers. In
addition, there is a strong expectation that the income elasticity is
nonpositive which leads to the integrability inequality of equation (2.12)
to be satisfied globally. A convenient distribution which imposes the
negativity restriction on g is the truncated normal with the truncation
point at zero. As Figure 3.2 show a wide variety of shapes of probability
densities can be accommodated with this specification. The individual
parameter g. can then be written as g = g + e where e. . fo TN(0,a.)
ftp) i Xi
*C0)
1 .
l'he er.Cecc oi unmert.su red characteristics in determining k^ will be ob-
servationally equivalent co the first source of random variation lop tt - lot? H*
which arises from differences of hours supplied from the utility maximizing
point.
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with a truncation point from above of -$. We assume that e, . and e_.
are independent sources of random variation. Given this stochastic spec-
-—22ification, the unknown parameters of the model are 6 = (6,ct,8,U-, ,cO •
We now use this stochastic specification to derive the likelihood function
for a sample of observations.
The analysis is confined to budget constraints with only two linear
segments, although generalization to more segments is straightforward.
A control observation faces a convex budget set while an experimental faces
a nonconvex budget set of the type drawn in Figure 3.1. The probability of
the point actually observed, H., depends on the unknown parameters 6 and a
and the densities for $ and e„ . . Neglecting e_. momentarily, let us
calculate the probability that a particular point, H, is the global max-
imum. For large negative values of $ the individual will have a global
maximum on the first segment; H* the global maximum will be less than
the breakeven point, H, and the net wage on the margin will be w with
associated virtual income y.. . As 6. increases toward zero the global
maximum point moves along the first segment toward H, until a critical
8. is reached at which the individual is indifferent between a solution
on the first segment and a solution on the second segment. This critical
8., say 8?, depends on the underlying utility function and on the un-
known parameters in that function. Using equation (2.8), 8* is calculated
quite easily by solving the following equation:
z
i
6
i-ta
l
~n Z i 6 M*f
e W
li yli
e W
li
.
y2i
< 3,2 ) ' + i-R* -
+ i-R*
l-Hx
P i 1-kx
P
i
For every experimental observation, this equation must be solved for 8?
each time the parameters change; however, the solution may be cheaply
obtained on a computer. As 8. rises from 8? to its limiting value,
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the global maximum moves upward along the second segment. Each value
of B. between -°° and zero therefore has an associated global maximum
level of hours; the probability that a particular level of hours is a
global maximum is the same as the probability of the associated income
elasticity, B. . We may now extend the analysis to observed hours of
work by noting the relationship between observed hours, H
.
, and desired
hours of work effort, H*,
(3.2a) log H
±
= log H* + e^ .
For any particular H , there are an infinite number of combinations
of H* and e. that satisfy (3.2a). By successively determining, for
every possible H*, the probability that the global maximum is H* and
the stochastic term e equals the difference between the logs of H*
and H
,
we can ascertain the probability that actual hours, H , will
be observed. Letting f(B) be the truncated normal density with associated
distribution F(B), and $(•) and $(•) be the standard normal density and
distribution, respectively, the probability of observing H. is
n,
(3.3) PNCj = / i-(j)
-co 2
log H
±
- log HJ±
CT
2
f(B)dB
i
+ / H
B* 2
log H
±
- log H^
°2
f(B)dB
where log H* = Z.6 + a log w .. + B log y., where j is an index of the
budget segment. Evaluation of these integrals is equivalent to evaluation
of a normal distribution <I>(z) and is thus inexpensive to perform on a
computer. ' The truncated density for B poses no problem since it is a
"See the appendix for derivation of the evaluation procedure for the
integrals.
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normal density divided by a standard normal distribution which remains
constant across all observations.
The case of a convex budget set is slightly different because there
exists a range for 8, say BL to BU., for which the utility maximizing
point is at the kink point K in Figure 3.3. If the individual's 8. is con-
Fm *.3
siderably less than zero, the global maximum H* will be on the first
segment with associated net wage w and nonlabor income y 1 . If his
income elasticity is quite near zero, the utility maximum will lie along
the second segment corresponding to net wage w and virtual and nonlabor
income y„. The range of g that places the utility maximum at the kink
point is easily computed from the uncompensated labor supply function.
The lower point of the range, BL , is the greatest 8. on the first budget
segment that leads to a utility maximum at the kink point
(3.4) BL
i
=
log H. - Z.6 - a log w.
,
i i li
log yli
Correspondingly, the upper point of the range, BU , is the smallest 8.
consistent with a global maximum on the second segment, and therefore
(3.5) BU
±
=
log H
j
- Z
±
S - a log w
21
log y2i
All 8,'s that lie between BL, and BU. thus lead to a utility maximum
i I i
at the kink point, H.. The probability that the observed level of hours
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H. corresponds to a utility maximum at the kink point is
(3.5) pr(log H* + log e
21
= log H
±
|log H* = log H
1
)«pr(log H* = log H.) =
log H
±
- log H
1
BU
i
/ f(B)dB
BL,
For observed hours of work H. corresponding to B.'s outside the range
BL to BU
, the probabilities are similar to those calculated in equa-
tion (3.3). Thus, for the case of a convex budget set the probability of
observing actual hours worked H is
(3.6)
BL,
PC, = /
—(f)
log H
1
- log H*
±
f(3)dB
°2
log H
i
- log S
i]
°2
F(BU
1
) - F(BL
1 )
1
BU 2
log H
1
- log H*.
I J
f(3)d6
Given our stochastic specification of the model, we. are able to specify
the probability of observing actual hours worked as a function of the
unknown parameter values. The natural method of estimation is then maximum
likelihood estimation, in which the unknown parameter values are chosen
so as to maximize the probability of observing the sample. Our method
can be extended, in principle, to cover the case of an arbitrarily large
number of budget segments per individual although this extension will
not be undertaken here. In the next section we apply our methodology to
evaluate the results of the Gary Income Maintenance Experiment.
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4. Calculation of Budget Sets, Data, and Sample Considerations
We use the labor supply model to estimate a structural model of labor
supply for adult married males who participated in the Gary Income Main-
tenance experiment. The experiment, which took place from 1971 to 1974, had
as participants residents of low income neighborhoods in Gary, Indiana.
All participants were black. The families were not chosen for the experiment
at random, a problem which we will discuss later in this section. Participants
in the Gary experiment were randomly assigned to one of four NIT plans or to
control status. (Control families received no benefits except a small pay-
ment for their continued participation.) Each of the NIT plans can be
described in terms of two parameters: the constant marginal tax rate and
the basic support level. In two of the plans, wage and nonwage income was
subject to a 40 percent tax rate; in the remaining two, income was taxed
at a 60 percent rate. Two of the Gary NIT plans offered basic income supports,
scaled according to family size, that were equal to slightly more than the
poverty level. The other two plans offered basic supports, also scaled to
family size, that were one-quarter less. All federal, state, and F.I.C.A.
income tax liabilities were fully reimbursed for income up to the breakeven
point H. Earned income above the breakeven point was taxed according to
the federal, state, and F.I.C.A. tax tables.
Thus for individuals eligible for NIT payments, the intercept y. in
Figure 3.1 equals the NIT income guarantee plus net (after tax) nonwage
income. The slope of the first budget segment, w , is determined by the
worker's gross wage rate times one minus the experimental NIT tax rate.
For the second segment of the NIT budget line, the virtual income intercept,
y , and net wage, w„, are calculated in the same manner as the second
segment of a control individual's budget set, the calculation of which we
now describe.
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Control families are assumed to face a budget line with only two
linear segments. This assumption results in a substantial simplification
in budget lines, since the federal income tax schedule has a large number
of kinks at lower levels of taxable income. However, low income families
face only one important kink in this schedule, one which occurs at the
point where family exemptions and deductions are equal to countable family
income. At that point the federal tax rate rises from 0% to 14%. There-
after, the tax rate changes in relatively small steps. In calculating the
budget lines for control individuals, we assume that the marginal tax rate
along the first segment equals 5.85% for F.I.C.A. plus the 2% Indiana state
income tax rate. The second budget segment is calculated on the assumption
that workers face an additional 18% marginal tax rate because of the federal
income tax. The kink point H is calculated by assuming that workers
took standard income exemptions and used the low-income tax deduction
available in 1973. Nonwage income is assumed to be nontaxable.
Data on workers' hours, wages, nonwage income, and personal character-
istics were taken from the first, fourth, and seventh of the periodic
interviews administered to participants in the experiment during the period
of NIT payments. To be included in the sample, workers must have responded
to at least two of the three interviews. ' Since we are interested in
long-run labor supply response, the measure of labor supply is an average
2.
of working hours in the three representative weeks during the experiment.
'Since approximately 35% of the individuals dropped out of the experiment
with attrition of controls 10% higher than attrition for experimentals , a
problem of attrition bias might occur. However, Hausman and Wise [1977a]
in a study of possible attrition bias on this sample concluded that while
it is serious for analysis of variance models, it does not pose a problem
for structural models which control for individual characteristics and
experimental design parameters.
2
'A more long-run measure of labor supply is desirable, but such data
are not available at the present time.
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Individuals not observed to be working are omitted from the current sample.
This feature of the labor supply model may be modified by specifying and
estimating a separate behavioral equation for an individual's participation
in the labor force as Heckman [1974] and Hanoch [1976] have done for women.
This extension is not undertaken here since the sample consists of prime-age
males who are heads of household. The proportion of the sample that does
not participate in the labor force in this sample is quite small; and
presumably for a sample of average yearly hours worked, the number of
nonparticipants would decline even further. Nevertheless, we intend to add
the behavioral equation for labor force participation in future work on
average yearly labor supply when such data become available.
A problem referred to in passing is that initial sample selection
was not random but was based on current earnings. Thus the possibility
of substantial bias exists since hours worked is one component of earnings.
Sample truncation did not occur in Gary, but families whose earnings are
above 2.4 times the poverty limit were undersampled by a factor of three.
Note, that the cutoff line was substantially higher in Gary than in New
Jersey so that even if total truncation had occurred, the effect on the
2
conditional mean would be less. In estimating the effects of the Gary
NIT we used the consistent weighted estimator proposed by Hausman and Wise
[1977b]. Since the results differed only slightly from the nonweighted
estimates, in discussing our results we will present only the nonweighted
estimates. Apparently, the combination of the high cutoff line of 2.4
"In fact, in the New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experiment where sample
truncation occurred at 1.5 times the poverty limit Hausman and Wise L1976,
1977] found that the ratio of estimated coefficients rose by a factor ap
high as 200% when sample truncation was accounted for.
2
'Hausman and Wise [1977a, 1977b] propose and estimate a maximum likelihood
estimator which accounts for the nonrandom sample selection. However, they
find little indication of bias in an earnings equation.
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times the poverty limit and the presence of an undersampled group above the
cutoff led to little or no truncation bias.
In this section we have discussed computation of the nonlinear budget
set for each individual pointing out how marginal tax rates are computed.
We then discussed the sample used from the Gary Income Maintenance Experiment
as well as possible biases resulting from attrition bias, nonlabor force
participation, and truncation bias. In the next section we present the
specification of the individual intercept k. in the uncompensated labor
supply function as a function of individual characteristics. We then
present and discuss our results, concluding with policy implications
and ideas for future research.
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Results
Both the uncompensated labor supply function, equation (2.4), and the
associated indirect utility function, equation (2.8), include the unknown
parameters k, a, and 6. It will be recalled that a and 8 are assumed
to be independent of individual characteristics while k is specified to
depend on these characteristics through k = exp(Z,6 + e
? .). A wide
variety of personal characteristics may affect tastes for work; the fol-
lowing list was chosen by reference to earlier research on the NIT experi-
ments :
Constant
Education : A dummy variable is used for individuals whose educational
attainment is less than nine years.
Number of Adults : Number of persons aged 16 or more residing in the
household.
Poor Health : A dummy variable is used if the individual reported
his health to be "poor in relation to others" and zero otherwise.
Age : A variable equal to the age of the respondent minus 45 years
was used if this age exceeded 45 years. Otherwise the age variable was set
to zero. The other unknown structural parameters of the model are the wage
elasticity a and parameters in the distribution of the income elasticity
f(B).
The sample consists of 380 individuals assumed to be independent
observations. Once the budget lines have been determined for each in-
dividual, the unknown parameters can be estimated by the method of maximum
likelihood. The log likelihood equals the sum of the logs of the prob-
abilities of actual hours worked by the NIT-eligible individuals, log PNC ,
from equation (3.3), and the logs of the probabilities of actual hours
29
worked by the control individuals, log PC., from equation (3.6). Thus
the log likelihood function has the form
N
l
N
2
(5.1) L = £ log PNC. + £ log PC.
1=1 1=1 X
where the number of experimental N. and controls N„ equals 247 and 133,
respectively. Approximately 65 percent of the sample was eligible for the
NIT. Because of technical reasons discussed in the appendix, the likeli-
hood function was maximized using the gradient method of Berndt, Hall,
Hall, and Hausman [1974] as well as the no derivative conjugant gradient
method of Powell [1964]. Both techniques converged to the same maximum of
the likelihood function. A variety of starting points converged to the
same optimum leading us to conclude we have found the global maximum.
Results are presented in Table 1. All the elements of k believed
to affect tastes for work have the expected effects. Poor health reduced
expected labor supply by 2.25% while a 60 year old is expected to work
12% less due to his age, other things equal. Increased family size, on
the other hand, is related to higher levels of expected work effort which
leads to the conclusion that endogeneity of nonwage income is probably
not a serious problem. Moreover, the effect of relatively low levels of
educational attainment is in the expected direction under the assumption
that more educated workers have a wider variety of activities to pursue in
their nonwork time. The estimates of these parameters are relatively
precise, except for the effect of increased age; all except the coefficient
of age are significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
The parameter estimates most important to the design of a negative
income tax are the ones that measure work response to the level of the
income guarantee and to the marginal tax rate. Our first finding is the
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Table 1
Variable
Constant
Primary Education
Number of Adults
Poor Health
Age
Wage Elasticity, a
Mean Income Elasticity, (3
r
Variance of 3 distribution, O-
Variance of £„., a„
Parameter Estimates
(Asymptotic Standard Errors)
3.75043
(.02555)
.01078
(.00558)
.03300
(.01272)
-.02224
(.00438)
-.00869
(.01347)
. 00003
(.01632)
-.04768
(.00465)
.06751
(.00399)
.00135
(.00022)
Number of Observations = 380
Log of the Likelihood Function = -196.27
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lack of a perceptible effect on labor supply of variations In the NIT
tax rate. The estimated wage elasticity is .00003 and even at a range of
two standard errors is less than .04 in magnitude. * This estimate
is well below the Hausman-Wise [1976] estimate for white males in the
New Jersey NIT. This finding is consistent, however, with the Hausman-Wise
[1977a] findings for the same Gary sample. Using a reduced form earnings
specification, they found the labor response to the level of the income
guarantee to be much more important than the response to the marginal tax
2,
rate. While no direct effect of different marginal tax rates is found
here, an indirect effect is present through the effect of taxes on a
family's nonwage income. Consider two individuals with identical gross
wage rates and nonwage income who are offered identical NIT income guaran-
tees but have different NIT tax rates. They will have substantially dif-
ferent budget sets because the tax rate affects the locus of the breakeven
point H in Figure 3.1. The individual with the lower tax rate is more
likely to work less than the breakeven level of hours and is therefore
likely to respond to a higher level of nonwage income than the individual
with the higher NIT tax rate. Nonetheless, the finding of essentially
zero wage elasticity leads to the conclusion that the wide variation in
after tax wage rates had little effect on labor supply among the black
males in the Gary NIT experiment.
On the other hand, the estimate of the income elasticity was found
to be quite significantly different from zero. The average income elasticity
'Note that the integrability condition of equation (2.10) is satisfied
in the sample. When the distribution f(6) was not truncated at zero,
the estimate of a was .0305 although the estimate was not very precise.
2
'In fact, for low levels of income guarantee Hausman-Wise found the re-
sponse to a higher marginal tax rate among experimental individuals to be
in the wrong direction, although the response was only estimated very
imprecisely.
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in the sample is estimated at -.04768. To assess the effect of the income
guarantee under the NIT, consider a family of four with one other adult
present with the worker in good health, under 45 years of age, and with a
ninth grade education (all near the mean of the sample) . Using our es-
timates, the worker's expected preferred hours of work at a pretax wage of
$3.50 per hour with the (convex) income tax budget set are 39.943 hours per
week. ' For comparison to a NIT plan, we assign an income guarantee of
$3500 and a marginal tax rate of 60 percent. Preferred hours of work fall
2,
to 36.985, a change of 2.958 hours per week or 7.69 percent. ' Weekly
earnings under the NIT rise to $119.07 from after tax earnings of $115.54
without the NIT. Thus, a significant work response to introduction of a
NIT is found to exist, although its magnitude is not especially large. The
effects of other NIT plans may be estimated in a similar manner, averaging
over different family characteristics to find the average population re-
sponse.
Since a distribution of income elasticities was estimated for the
population, it is interesting to consider the estimated density f(8).
As Figure 5.1 shows the truncated normal distribution consists of the
extreme left tail of a regular normal distribution.
'It is important to take the expectation with respect to f (3) rather
than at the mean 3 due to the skewness of the f(8) distribution. Thus,
we calculate EH* = / H*(8)f(B)d$.
2.
"This estimate is approximately equal to earlier estimates for the total
response in the Gary sample by Kehrer et al. [1976] and by Hausman and
Wise [1977c] who found an average response of 7.97 percent among NIT
individuals
.
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Thus while the mean J3 = -.04768 the median &., = -.03331 which means
a substantial proportion of the population had a very low income elasticity.
In fact, about 20% of the population is estimated to have an income
elasticity of between zero and 1%. Since the variance of e„. is very small
compared to the variance of the g distribution, we can conclude that most
of the observed variation in response to the NIT experiment results from
differences in individual preferences rather than from random difference
between the utility maximum and observed hours of work. Given this con-
clusion, we can interpret the estimate of the B distribution as suggesting
that a small proportion of the Gary sample is substantially more responsive
to the presence of an income guarantee in making their labor supply deci-
sion than is the rest of the population. This pattern of response indicates
that most individuals will vary their labor supply very little in response
to the introduction of NIT plans similar to those plans used in the Gary
experiment. A few individuals, however, will react with large reductions
in labor supply. From estimates in the Gary sample, this responsiveness
seems to be the result of increases in nonwage income rather than increases
in the result of the marginal tax rate on earned income. A possible ex-
planation of this result is that some individuals take an increased amount
of time in between jobs if they have an income guarantee. They do not
search and find jobs with higher wages since the wage distribution re-
mains virtually identical for control individuals and NIT individuals.
Thus the income effect is much more important than the uncompensated
wage effect in determining the response to introduction of a NIT.
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6. Conclusion
Given estimates of the unknown parameters In the uncompensated labor
supply function of equation (2.4) and the associated indirect utility
function of equation (2.8), we could, in principle, do an applied welfare
economics analysis in designing a Negative Income Tax to maximize various
welfare measures subject to a budget constraint. However, since our es-
timate of a is zero, the derivative of the indirect utility function
with respect to changes in the marginal tax rate is simply a constant
proportional to the tax change since no labor supply response is expected.
Nor is the estimated income response very high for most individuals.
Thus, we might more simply conclude that within the range of guarantees and
marginal tax rates considered in the Gary NIT experiment, the combination
of a high guarantee and a high tax rate would lead to the fulfillment of
one goal of a Negative Income Tax, which is to provide a basic level of
income support at the poverty line, without at the same time causing pay-
ments to be made to families with relatively high levels of earnings or
causing a substantial reduction in population labor supply.
Considerable future research is desirable in estimating the effect
on labor supply of government programs which create nonconvexities in the
budget set. These programs may induce large distortions on individual
economic activity, and the size of this effect is an important considera-
tion in evaluating such programs. The type of model developed here can be
extended to cover a wide variety of such situations.
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Appendix
Evaluation of the log likelihood function requires evaluation of the
integrals in equation (3.3) for nonconvex budget sets and equation (3.6)
for convex budget sets. Two types of integrals are present. The more
complicated integral has the form
(A.l) L° 2
log H
±
-
- Z
±
6 -- a log w -- 6 log yu
CT
2
,
f(3)dB
The truncated normal density nas the form
B-u,
(A. 2) f(B) - Li
where y Q and aa are the parameters of the corresponding untruncated dis-
cs p
tribution. The standard normal density in the numerator can be combined
with the other normal density in the integral. To combine the two densities
note that without truncation log H is distributed normally with mean
2 2 2
x, 8 + a log w. + y log y. . and variance c D (log y14 ) + a„. Now consideringi li p ±i p 11 /
the joint distribution of 6 and log H , we write it as
(A. 3) f(B, log n
±
) = f(B|log H
±
)f(log H
± )
where f(*) stands for the appropriate density. The conditional density
f(B|log H ) (without truncation) is districuted normally with conditional
mean y
g
+ [c* log y^] /[cJg(log y^)
2
+ a*] (log E
j
- Z
±
6 - a log w
±i
- p
g
log y^)
2 2 2 2 2
and conditional variance a Da„/[aD (log y ) + a_) . Using equation (A. 3) andp i. p 11 £
equation (A. 2) to simplify the integral of equation (A.l) and evaluating
it yields
(A. 4)
B*
1 -.*
- / f(e2 |B)f(B)dB =
36
fV,
1 - $ 1/
2-2, 2
a
6
y+a
2
log H. - Z.6 - aw
/ 2-2, 2V^2
V (BJ-U )/*o'i H B' r2~2,
a
B
a
2
a
g
y(log H
1
- Z
d
6 - aw Ugy)
.
/ 2-2 2
a2#apy +a2
where w = log w. and y = log y, . • The somewhat formidable expression
on the right hand side of equation (A. 4) is quite simple to evaluate,
requiring evaluation of one normal density and two normal distributions
where the distribution in the denominator remains constant across obser-
vations. The only other type of integral appears as the middle term in the
convex budget set probability of equation (3.6). It is easily evaluated as
(A. 5)
log H. - log H,
F(BUj) - F(BL.
I
1 - *
'3
log K - log HJ IBI^ - Ug
$ I -
o.
B
BL
i
" y
B
Two techniques were used to maximize the likelihood function.
Convergence was obtained using the modified scoring method proposed
by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman [1974], Only first derivatives
are required for this algorithm. However, as a check to make certain that
the global maximum was achieved, the no derivative conjugate gradient
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routine of Powell [1964] was also used to verify the parameter estimates.
The reason for this caution is that while the log likelihood function of
equation (5.1) is everywhere differentiable in the parameters, the deriva-
tives are not everywhere continuous because of the kink point. While
proofs of the usual large sample properties of maximum likelihood were not
attempted in this nonregular case, consistency of the estimates would
follow from the usual type of proof. However, proof of asymptotic nor-
mality of the estimates is complicated by the lack of continuous deriv-
atives, and the reported asymptotic standard errors should be interpreted
with this problem in mind. Starting values for the maximum likelihood
programs were estimated using an instrumental variable technique to predict
the net wage and nonlabor income at the sample mean of 35 hours of work.
One last econometric note concerns the question of whether the gross
wage should be treated as endogenous. Many studies in the past have
treated it as endogenous, but the reasons advanced for the usual spec-
ification of a triangular system of a wage equation excluding hours in
addition to the hours equation are not present here since we use the
appropriate net wages. Previous studies usud only one net wage and since
the level of utility maximizing labor supply is observed with error the
single net wage rate is also observed with an error that is correlated with
the error between actual and preferred hours. Thus a simultaneous equation
problem existed. Here since all appropriate net wages are observed and
used in the labor supply specification the main cause of the simultaneous
equation problem will not occur. Nevertheless, in our preliminary in-
vestigations with the Gary data we did specify and estimate such a system
making the gross (market) wage a function of personal characteristics. The
results of the joint estimation were similar to those obtained when the
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gross wage was taken to be exogenous, and a specification error test of
Hausman [1976] failed to reject the null hypothesis that the market wage
could be treated as exogenous and measured without significant error.
Thus, simultaneous equation estimation results are not presented in the
paper.
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